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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a mechanism that aims to speed up the development cycle
of security protocols, by adding automated aid for diagnosis and repair. Our mechanism
relies on existing verification tools analyzing intermediate protocols and synthesizing potential
attacks if the protocol is flawed. The analysis of these attacks (including type flaw attacks)
pinpoints the source of the failure and controls the synthesis of appropriate patches to the
protocol. Using strand spaces [39], we have developed general guidelines for protocol repair,
and captured them into formal requirements on (sets of) protocol steps. For each requirement,
there is a collection of rules that transform a set of protocol steps violating the requirement
into a set conforming it. We have implemented our mechanism into a tool, called Shrimp. We
have successfully tested Shrimp on numerous faulty protocols, all of which were successfully
repaired, fully automatically.
1 Introduction
A security protocol is a protocol that aims to establish one or more security goals, often a combi-
nation of authentication, confidentiality or non-repudiation. Security protocols are critical appli-
cations, because they are crucial to provide key Internet services, such as electronic-banking. So,
security protocols are thoroughly studied to guarantee that there does not exist an interleaving of
protocol runs violating a security goal, called an attack. Designing a security protocol is, however,
error-prone. Although security protocols may be extremely simple, consisting of only a few steps,
they are difficult to get right. Formal methods have been successfully used to identify subtle
assumptions underlying a number of faulty protocols, yielding novel attacks.
In this paper, we introduce a mechanism that aims to speed up the development cycle of
security protocols, by adding automated support for diagnosis and repair. Our mechanism has been
especially designed to fix protocols that are susceptible to an attack of the full class replay [37].1
This attack class includes a number of sub-classes; some are well known, such as reflection, and
unknown key share, but others have passed slightly ignored, like type flaw.2
Overview of Approach for Comparison There exist several approaches to security protocol
development, ranging from the systematic generation of a protocol (called protocol synthesis) to the
transformation of a given protocol into one that is stronger, up to some specified properties (called
protocol compiling). Protocol synthesis (blindly) generates a candidate protocol, and then tests
it to see if it complies with the intended security requirements. By contrast, protocol compiling
(blindly) transforms an input protocol, by wrapping it with explicit security constructs; thus,
1A replay attack is one where a valid message is maliciously repeated in other (not necessarily different) session;
so, the active participation of a penetrator is required (c.f. the Dolev-Yao penetrator model [17]).
2A type flaw attack is one where a participant confuses a (field of a) message containing data of one type with
a message data of another.
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protocol compiling barely depends on the security guarantees provided by the input protocol, if
any. Our method is in between, and follows the formal approach to software development; it is
applied after a failed verification attempt, in order to spot a protocol flaw, and suggest a candidate
patch.
To compare the relative value of our approach against that of all these competitors, we suggest
to use efficiency of a given output security protocol. There are three common criteria for measuring
this dimension [23]:
Round complexity, the number of rounds until the protocol terminates. A round is a collection
of messages that can be simultaneously sent by parties, assuming that the adversary delivers
all these messages intact, immediately, and to the corresponding party.
Message complexity, the maximum number of messages sent by any single party.
Communication complexity, the maximum number of bits sent by any single party.
We shall have more to say about this later on in the text, when comparing our method against
rival techniques (see Section 8.)
Contributions of Paper In this paper, we make four key contributions. First, we provide a fully
automated repair mechanism, which supersedes and surpasses our previous methods (see [25, 21].)
The new mechanism has been entirely developed within strand spaces [39], and it is no longer
heuristic-based. We have used strand spaces to provide a full characterization of a wide class of
protocol attacks, and our repair strategies, in a way amenable to mechanization. Our mechanism
for protocol repair has been successfully tested on a number of faulty protocols collected from the
literature. Second, we provide a handful of basic principles for protocol repair, stemmed from
our insights on our strand spaces characterization of a failed verification attempt. Our repair
principles are simple and intuitive, and follow from a straight formalization of an interleaving of
partial protocol runs, and the way messages are used to achieve an attack. Third, we provide an
extension of the theory of strand spaces, which encapsulates issues about the implementation of
messages, hence, providing a neat border between reasoning about the representation of a message,
from reasoning about its actual form (a byte stream). Our extension consists of an equivalence
relation over messages, and a distinctive notion of message origination. With it, we have been able
to capture type flaw attacks, using the constructions of the strand spaces calculus. What is more,
our abstraction of messages enables the transparent application of our strategies for protocol repair;
that is, we can fix protocols that are subject to a replay attack because a protocol message can
be mixed up with other one, without considering whether message confussion exploits a type flaw
or not. Fourth, we provide a comparison of protocol repair against other prominent approaches
for protocol development, concluding that our approach gives the designer a better insight for
protocol development, guiding the conception for the roˆle of messages and their composition.
Overview of Paper The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: first, we overview our
approach to protocol repair (see Section 2). Then, we introduce notation and key, preliminary
concepts (see Section 3). Next, we introduce and discuss the soundness of our extended version
of strand spaces, suitable to capture type flaw attacks (see Section 4). Then, after describing the
kinds of flaws we want to automatically repair (see Section 5), we provide a method for automatic
protocol repair (see Section 6), and the results obtained from an experimental test (see Section 7).
We conclude the paper, after comparing related work and giving directions to further work (see
Sections 8 and 9).
2 Protocol Repair: General Approach
Our approach to protocol repair involves the use of two tools (see Fig. 1). One tool is a protocol
verifier (e.g. OFMC [6, 5], ProVerif [8], or Cl-Atse [40]), which is used to analyze the protocol
at hand and to yield an attack on that protocol, if the protocol is faulty. The other tool, called
Shrimp, embodies our mechanism for protocol repair. Shrimp compares the attack against a run
of the protocol where the penetrator does not participate, called a regular run. This comparison
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usually spots differences that indicate where the protocol went wrong. Depending on these differ-
ences, Shrimp offers various candidate patches, each of which modifies the protocol in a specific
way. Some patches may rearrange parts of an individual message or enrich it with additional
information, while others may alter the flow of messages in the protocol.
Our approach to protocol repair is iterative. Since we proceed from a local perspective to fix a
problem that has become apparent during attack inspection, we cannot guarantee that a fix will
remove all flaws from the protocol. So, the mended protocol is sent back to the verification tool
for reanalysis. If this tool still detects a bug, either because this other bug was already present
in the original protocol (as often is) or because it was introduced by our method (as has never
happened so far), we iterate, applying our repair strategies on the mended protocol.
Our patches change the protocol in a very restricted and conservative way, since we have no
explicit representation of the intended purpose of a protocol. For example, suppose that to prevent
a replay attack we have to change the structure of an individual message in a protocol so that it
uniquely determines the protocol run, as well as the protocol step it originates from. To preserve
the semantics of that message, we modify it only in such a way that the new message preserves
both encryption (it is encrypted in the same way) and information (it contains all information
present in the original message), with respect to the knowledge of some keys.
Attack analysis and protocol repair are driven by a handful of informal guidelines for protocol
design. We have translated these principles into formal requirements on sets of protocol steps.
For each requirement, there is a collection of rules that transform a set of protocol steps violating
the requirement into a set conforming it. The correction of security protocols incorporates the
use of several of these rules. However, protocol patches are not independent; so a rule requires
preconditions to be applicable and should guarantee postconditions once it has been applied.
We have developed our mechanism within (our extension to) the theory of strand spaces [39].
Thus, the specification of a protocol and of one of its associated attack have both to be given using
the strand space notation. Extra machinery is required to translate a given protocol specification
so it is suitable for the chosen verification tool (see Fig. 1). Also, extra machinery is required to
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Figure 1: Overview of the general approach
translate the attack output by that verification tool, if the protocol is faulty, so that the attack
can be used by Shrimp. We will see later on in the text that since a protocol specification and a
protocol attack must each form a bundle, this translation is straightforward. However, care needs
to be taken when the attack to the protocol is type-flaw, since in this case the translation needs
to deal with the introduction of special construction blocks that justify the type flaw attack. We
call these construction blocks implementation traces, as shall be seen in Section 4. A preliminary
version of Shrimp is available at http://homepage.cem.itesm.mx/raulm/pub/shrimp/.
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3 Formal Preliminaries
We now recall standard concepts and notations about security protocols, in general, and from
strands spaces [38, 39, 18], in particular. For a thorough introduction to the strand spaces,
though, readers are referred to [39].
As usual, we consider messages, A, as the set of terms, which is freely generated from the
sets of atomic messages, TK, consisting of nonces, Nonce, timestamps, Timestamp, agent names,
Agent, tags, Tag, and keys, K, using concatenation, m1;m2, and encryption, {|m|}k, with k ∈ K
and m,m1,m2 ∈ A.
We assume two functions. One maps principals, a, b, . . ., to their public keys, ka, kb, . . ., and
the other a pair of principals, 〈a, b〉, to their symmetric, shared key, kab. The set of keys, K,
comes with an inverse operator, mapping either each member of a key pair for an asymmetric
cryptosystem to the other, (ka)
−1 = k−a , or each symmetric key to itself, (kab)
−1 = kab.
PartsK maps a message t ∈ A to the set containing all the subterms of t that are accessible know-
ing the set of keys, K ; i.e. it is the least set satisfying: t ∈ PartsK (t), PartsK (ti) ⊆ PartsK (t1; t2),
for i ∈ {1, 2}, and PartsK (t) ⊆ PartsK ({|t|}k), if k−1 ∈ K . Parts(t) = PartsK(t) defines the set of all
subterms. We write t vK t′ (and t v t′, respectively) to denote t ∈ PartsK (t′) (and t ∈ Parts(t′),
respectively).
Let t and K be a message and a set of keys, respectively. Further, let M0, M1, . . . be a sequence
of sets of messages and K0, K1, . . . be a sequence of sets of keys, such that K0 = K , M0 = PartsK (t),
Ki+1 = Ki ∪ (K ∩Mi), and Mi+1 =
⋃
t′∈Mi PartsKi+1(t
′). Since a message contains only finitely
many keys, there is an i0 with Kj = Kj+1, for all j ≥ i0. Therefore, M0, M1, . . . has a fixed-point,
M∞, which we call AnalzK (t). Let M be a set of messages; then Synthz(M) is the smallest set such
that: M ⊆ Synthz(M); if m1,m2 ∈ Synthz(M), then m1;m2 ∈ Synthz(M); and if m ∈ Synthz(M)
and k ∈ Synthz(M), then {|m|}k ∈ Synthz(M).
Let fl(t) be the set of all messages in a message t obtained by flattening the top-level concate-
nations; i.e. fl(t) = {t′ ∈ Parts∅(t)|t′ ∈ TK or ∃m, k. t′ = {|m|}k}. Whenever m ∈ fl(t), m is said to
be a component of t. In an abuse of notation, we write TK(m) for the set of atomic messages in
m; i.e. TK(m) = {t ∈ TK|t ∈ PartsK(m)}. We also extend TK(·) to a homomorphism over sets of
terms in the expected manner.
A strand represents a principal’s local view on a protocol. Thus, a strand s is a sequence of
directed messages (called nodes), ±t1 ⇒s ±t2, . . .⇒s ±tn, each of which contains the information
whether the message is received from the outside (indicated by the sign “-”), or sent by the
principal (indicated by “+”). Accordingly, we call a node either positive or negative. The relation
⇒s connects consecutive messages in strand s. ⇒+s and ⇒∗s are respectively used to denote the
transitive, and the transitive-reflexive closure of ⇒s. We write ⇒T for the union of ⇒s, for all
s ∈ T . Notice, however, that, when understood from the context, we shall simply write⇒ to refer
to ⇒s.
Let v = 〈s, i〉 denote the i-th node of a strand s. Then, we respectively use msg(v) and sign(v)
to denote the message, and the event, sending or reception, associated with node v. We write
#(s) to stand for the length of a strand s; thus, 1 ≤ i ≤ #(s), whenever 〈s, i〉 denotes the i-th
node of strand s.
The abilities of a Dolev-Yao penetrator are characterized by means of a set of building blocks,
called penetrator strands. There are eight penetrator strands: (K)ey: 〈+k〉, provided that
k ∈ KP, with KP being the set of keys initially known to the penetrator; (T)ee: 〈−m, +m, +m〉;
(F)lush: 〈−m〉; (M)essage: 〈+m〉, provided that m ∈ Agent or m ∈ Nonce; (C)oncatenation:
〈−m1,−m2, +m1;m2〉; (S)eparation: 〈−m1;m2, +m1, +m2〉; (E)ncryption: 〈−k,−m, + {|m|}k〉;
and finally (D)ecryption: 〈− {|m|}k , +k, +m〉.
A strand space Σ denotes a set of strands. Given two strands, s and s′, with s 6= s′, 〈s, i〉 →
〈s′, j〉 represents inter-strand communication from s to s′. It requires the nodes messages to be
equal, i.e. msg(〈s, i〉) = msg(〈s′, j〉) but having complementary signs, i.e. sign(〈s, i〉) = + and
sign(〈s′, j〉) = −.
A bundle is a composition of (possibly incomplete) strands and penetrator traces, hooked
together via inter-strand communication. Formally, it is a finite, acyclic graph B = 〈V , (→ ∪ ⇒)〉,
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such that for every v2 ∈ V , the two following conditions hold: i) if sign(v2) = −, then there is a
unique v1 ∈ V with v1 → v2; and ii) if v1 ⇒ v2 then v1 ∈ V and v1 = 〈s, i〉 and v2 = 〈s, i + 1〉.
≺B and B denote respectively the transitive and the transitive-reflexive closure of (→ ∪ ⇒).
Let sa be the strand of participant a. If a is honest, then the strand sa, as well as each
individual strand node, 〈sa, i〉, is said to be regular. Otherwise, it is said to be penetrator. Let
v = 〈sa, j〉 be some node in the strand of participant a; then, we use Agent(v) = a to denote the
strand participant name.
The pair (Σ,P) is said to be an infiltrated strand space, whenever Σ is a strand space and
P ⊆ Σ, such that every p ∈ P is a penetrator strand. In an infiltrated strand space, (Σ,P), the
penetrator can build masquerading messages using M, K, F, T, C, S, E, and D, only. Notice that
penetrator traces of type M cannot suddenly output an unguessable nonce, which are modelled
using origination assumptions.
A bundle is said to be regular, if it contains no penetrator strands, and it is said to be penetrator,
otherwise. A message m is said to be a component of a node v if it is a component of msg(v). A
node v is said to be a M, K, . . . node, if it lies on a penetrator strand with a trace of kind M,
K, . . . .
The following section is entirely devoted to the extension of strand spaces that allows the
capture of type-attack flaws.
4 Extending Strand Spaces to Capture Type Flaw Attacks
The strand space approach, [39], see above, introduces messages as a freely generated datatype,
built up on atomic messages, like nonces, names, or keys, with the help of the two constructors,
namely: concatenation and encryption. Hence, messages are considered to be different if their
syntactical representations (as constructor ground terms) are different. However, in practice,
messages are typically implemented as byte-streams, and their parsing as messages may not be
unique: there might be two different messages that share the same implementation as a byte-
stream. Thus, the expectation of the receiver about a byte-stream controls the interpretation
it gives to the message. Put differently, a penetrator can fake a message (or parts thereof) by
(re-)using messages of the wrong type but with suitable implementation.
Example 1 For example, consider the Woo Lam pi1 protocol [41], given as a bundle below (there,
and henceforth, Init, Resp, and Serv stand for the initiator, responder, and the server, respec-
tively):
+a −→ −a
⇓ ⇓
−nb ←− +nb
⇓ ⇓
+ {|a; b;nb|}kas −→ −{|a; b;nb|}kas⇓
+
{∣∣a; b; {|a; b;nb|}kas ∣∣}kbs −→ −{∣∣a; b; {|a; b;nb|}kas ∣∣}kbs⇓ ⇓
−{|a; b;nb|}kbs ←− + {|a; b;nb|}kbs
Init Resp Serv
This protocol is vulnerable to a type flaw attack, when the implementation of nonces can be confused
with the implementation of encrypted messages, giving rise to the following attack:
1. spy(a) → b : a
2. b → spy(a) : nb
3. spy(a) → b : nb
4. b → spy(srv) : {|a; b;nb|}kbs
5. spy(srv) → b : {|a; b;nb|}kbs
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That nb and {|a; b;nb|}kas can be confused is not unreasonable, since the receiver, b, does not know
the key, kas, shared between a and s, and it is therefore not able to realize the hidden structure of
the message under encryption. 
Strand spaces cannot represent the attack above, since terms are freely generated. Hence any
guarantees we might obtain from this theory could make use of the freeness axioms, and so could
not be transferred to a situation where they do not hold. So, in what follows, we will extend the
strand space notation to deal with type flaw attacks.
4.1 Theories of Message Implementation
In a first step, we have to specify the implementation of messages, which we use to represent a
run of the protocol in practice. We assume that there is some translation function I that maps
any message t (given in the freely generated datatype) to its implementation I(t). Furthermore,
we assume also that there are implementations {| |}I and ;I for concatenation and encryption on
the implementation level, such that I is a homomorphism from messages to their implementations.
We also assume that I denotes a faithful representation on individual message types, i.e. we can
distinguish the implementations of, for instance, two agents or two nonces (while still a nonce
and a key can share a common implementation). The following definition formalizes this idea and
provides the minimal requirements to an implementation.
Definition 1 (Implementation, ≈) Let R be a set and let I be a mapping from A to R. (I, R)
is an implementation of A iff the following holds.
∀x, y ∈ A. I(x);II(y) = I(x; y) (1)
∀x, y ∈ A. {|I(x)|}II(y) = I({|x|}y) (2)
∀x, y ∈ Agent. I(x) = I(y)→ x = y (3)
∀x, y ∈ K. I(x) = I(y)→ x = y (4)
∀x, y ∈ Nonce. I(x) = I(y)→ x = y (5)
∀x, y ∈ Timestamp. I(x) = I(y)→ x = y (6)
where x and y are all meta-variables. We write m1 ≈I m2 iff I(m1) = I(m2). If I is fixed by the
environment we simply write m1 ≈ m2, instead of m1 ≈I m2
For a typical setting, we might need to extend Definition 1 with additional axioms specifying
in more detail how messages and their operations are implemented. For example, one might like to
formalize an implementation theory which copes with message length, i.e. one which assumes that
all types of atomic messages have a specific length. Then, reasoning about such a theory requires
arithmetic (and, in the worst case, properties of least common multiples). Another example
extension of Definition 1 is the use of Meadow’s probabilistic approach [30] to reason about the
equality of the implementations of two messages.
4.2 Implementation Traces
We now introduce the new ability of the penetrator that enables it to reinterpret a message m as
another message m′, as long as they share a common implementation. Since the Dolev-Yao-like
abilities of a penetrator are formalized by the set of penetrator traces (which it can use to analyze,
reuse and synthesize messages), we enlarge this set by an additional rule, we call I-trace.
Definition 2 (Penetrator Trace) Let KP denote the keys initially known to the penetrator.
Then, a penetrator trace of the extended strand space is either a penetrator strand, as given in
Section 3, or the following:3
3Recall that, for all m1,m2 ∈ A, m1 = m2 implies m1 ≈ m2; though, clearly, this implication does not reverse.
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(I)mplementation: 〈−m, +m′〉, provided that m ≈ m′, but m 6= m′.
We call the messages m and m′ camouflaged and spoofed, respectively.
Example 2 Consider the example flawed protocol Woo Lam pi1, introduced in Example 1. To
capture the attack to this protocol, we first formalize the theory for the implementation of messages.
So, besides the axioms given in Definition 1 (which hold for all implementations), we require that
the implementation of nonces can be confused with the implementation of encrypted messages:
hence, we add the following axiom:
∀z ∈ Nonce. ∃y ∈ K, x ∈ A. I(z) = I({|x|}y) (7)
Then, we build the penetrator bundle describing the type flaw attack, as follows:
spy b
+a −−−−−−→ −a
⇓ ⇓
−nb ←−−−−−− +nb
I− trace ⇓ ⇓
+ {|m|}k −−−−−−→ −{|m|}k
⇓ ⇓
−{|a; b; {|m|}k|}kbs ←−−−−−− + {|a; b; {|m|}k|}kbs
I− trace ⇓ ⇓
+ {|a; b;nb|}kbs −−−−−−→ −{|a; b;nb|}kbs
This bundle contains two I-trace instances. The first instance is used to reinterpret the nonce
nb as an encrypted message {|m|}k. To justify the application of the trace, both messages have
to agree on their implementation, i.e. I(nb) = I({|m|}k). Both, m and k, appear for the first
time4 at the second node of this I-trace, which basically means that the penetrator is free to choose
m and k such that I(nb) = I({|m|}k) holds. Axiom 7 guarantees that the penetrator will always
find appropriate values for m and k, and justifies the application of the I-trace rule. The second
instance of an I-trace rule is used to revert the reinterpretation and replaces {|m|}k by nb inside a
message. The justification of this application is rather simple: the penetrator has chosen m and
k such that I(nb) = I({|m|}k) holds. Applying axioms (1) and (2), we can deduce that then also
I({|a; b;nb|}kbs) = I({|a; b; {|m|}k|}kbs) holds, which guarantees the applicability of the I-trace rule
also in this case. 
In what follows, we will abstract from this example and formalize the justification of I-trace
rule applications in general.
4.3 Originating Terms and Implementation Equivalences
The application of the I-trace rule demands that two messages m and m′ share the same imple-
mentation. The proof for this precondition is done within the underlying implementation theory.
In the example above we have used the fact that the penetrator is free to choose m and k appro-
priately. Therefore, to justify the rule application we have to prove that:
∀nb ∈ Nonce. ∃k ∈ K. ∃m ∈ A. I(nb) = I({|m|}k) (8)
which is an easy consequence of axiom (7).
Notice that the proof obligation would change if the penetrator were not free to choose m and
k, because both messages have occurred on regular strands before applying any I-trace rule. In
such a case, we would have to prove:
∀nb ∈ Nonce. ∀k ∈ K. ∀m ∈ A. I(nb) = I({|m|}k) (9)
4The notion of message origination is an important one, and, hence, prompts adequate formalization; we shall
do so next, see Section 4.3.
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to ensure that the penetrator can always camouflage {|m|}k by nb regardless of how m and k have
been chosen beforehand. As a consequence all nonces and encrypted terms would share the same
implementation. Furthermore, due to the injectivity (5) of the implementation for nonces, (9)
implies that the set of messages can only contain a single nonce and a single encrypted term.
In practice, the proof obligation (9) is too strong and might prevent to reveal an attack since
a honest principal could have unintentionally chosen m and k in such a way that actually I(nb) =
I({|m|}k) holds. However, the probability for this to happen is similar to the probability that two
principals will independently choose the same nonce in order, for instance, to use it as a challenge.
This actually justifies our use of (8), and also illustrates the abstraction we have made in order to
avoid probability calculations, like they are done in [30, 31].
The question of selecting either (8) or (9) for justifying the first I-trace in Example 2 depends
on the fact whether m and k originate at the second node of the I-trace or not. The notion of a
node originating a term (e.g. a nonce) comprises the principal’s freedom to choose an appropriate
value for the term (e.g. the nonce). In the original approach, the notion of a node originating a
term is a syntactical property of strands [39]:
“Let B = 〈V , (→ ∪ ⇒)〉 be a bundle. An unsigned term m originates at a node v ∈ V ,
if sign(v) = +; m v msg(v); and m 6v msg(v′), for every v′ ⇒+ v. m is said to be
uniquely originating if it originates on a unique v ∈ V .”
Any information that a strand, or its respective principal learns, occurs syntactically within some
received message. Hence, a nonce originates in a particular node of a strand if it does not occur
syntactically in any previous node of this strand. In our setting, the situation is different, since
an information might be semantically included in a message but camouflaged by using I-traces.
For example, consider the second I-trace, 〈spy, 4〉 ⇒ 〈spy, 5〉, in the attack given in Example 2,
Although nb occurs in 〈spy, 5〉, it has been introduced in the bundle already in 〈spy, 2〉, and was
received by the I-trace camouflaged as {|m|}k in 〈spy, 4〉.
To guarantee that a term originates also in terms of its implementation at a specific node,
c.f. nb, we have to make sure that it was never subject to a camouflage. Therefore, given a node
v of a bundle, we collect all camouflages introduced by I-traces occurring in front of v in the set
of equational constraints of v:
Definition 3 (Equational constraints) Let B = 〈V , (→ ∪ ⇒)〉 be a bundle and let v ∈ V .
Then, the equational constraints of v wrt. B, written EQB(v), is a set of pairs given by:
EQB(v) = {〈msg(v1), msg(v2)〉 : v1 ⇒I-trace v2 and v2 B v}
where v1 ⇒I-trace v2 denotes both that v1 and v2 both lie on a penetrator strand, and that they
are interconnected via a trace of kind I.
Example 3 Going back to our running example, we find that EQ(〈spy, 4〉) = {〈nb, {|m|}k〉} and
EQ(〈spy, 5〉) = {〈nb, {|m|}k〉, 〈{|m|}k ,nb〉}. Using Definition 3, we can adapt the notion of messages
originating in a node to our settings. 
Definition 4 (Originating nodes) Let B = 〈V , (→ ∪ ⇒)〉 be a bundle and let v ∈ V be a node
in B. An atomic term m originates at v (in B) iff:
• sign(v) = +;
• m v msg(v);
• m 6v msg(v′) for every v′ ⇒+ v; and
• ∀〈m′,m′′〉 ∈ EQB(v). (m 6v m′ and m 6v m′′).
In an abuse of notation, we extend the above definition also to encrypted messages. Hence, an
encrypted message {|m′|}k originates at a node v (in B) iff {|m′|}k and v satisfy the conditions of
the atomic message m and node v in Definition 4. In our example of the Woo Lam pi1 protocol,
both m and k originate at 〈spy, 3〉.
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+a;na; b −−→ −a;na; b
.
.
. ⇓
.
.
. +a;na; b;nb −−→ −a;na; b;nb
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
.
.
. −
{∣∣∣ks; a;nb; {|a; b;na; ks|}kas ∣∣∣}kbs ←−− +
{∣∣∣ks; a;nb; {|a; b;na; ks|}kas ∣∣∣}kbs
.
.
. ⇓
−{|a; b;na; ks|}kas ; {|na;nc; b|}ks ←−− + {|a; b;na; ks|}kas ; {|na;nc; b|}ks⇓ ⇓
+ {|nc; a|}ks −−→ −{|nc; a|}ks
Init Resp Serv
Figure 2: Bundle of the KP-protocol in [36]
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Example 4 (The KP Protocol) Another example protocol that is subject to a type flaw attack
is KP (see Fig. 2). Snekkenes [36] discusses this protocol and illustrates the attack. The type flaw
attack to KP is based on the facts that:
1. On step 3, the responder, b, extracts {|a; b;na; ks|}kas from the component encrypted under
kbs, and, then, on step 4, sends this extracted message to a;
2. Keys, agents and encrypted share common implementations (c.f. the first component of the
fourth message of the responder); and
3. Therefore, the implementation of message 3 can be misinterpreted (in a different run) to be
the implementation of the first component of message 4.
Similar to the previous example, we build up an appropriate message theory reflecting the as-
sumptions laid on before. Besides axioms (1)—(6), we require additional axioms specifying the
assumption that keys (generated dynamically by the server) and agents (or encrypted messages,
respectively) potentially share the same implementation:
∀x ∈ Agent. ∃w ∈ K. I(x) = I(w) (10)
∀w ∈ K. ∃w′ ∈ K, y ∈ A. I(w) = I({|y|}w′) (11)
Fig. 3 illustrates the resulting attack in the strand space notation using our notion of I-traces.
This example penetrator bundle contains three I-traces. Node 〈spy, 7〉 originates the key k′s on the
penetrator strand. Since this key originates at 〈spy, 7〉, the penetrator is free to choose its value,
and axiom (10) guarantees that there is an appropriate key k′s possessing the same implementation
as a.
Similar arguments hold for 〈spy, 7〉 originating m and k by using axiom (11). For 〈spy, 9〉, it
is the case that EQB(〈spy, 9〉) = {〈a, k′s〉, 〈ks, {|m|}k〉}, which justifies the application of the I-trace
rule application, since it implies trivially that I({|m|}k) = I(ks) holds. 
10
+b;n′b; a −−→ −b;n′b; a
⇓ ⇓
−b;n′b; a;n′a ←−− +b;n′b; a;n′a
⇓ ...
−a;n′a; b ←−− +a;n′a; b
⇓ ...
− . . . ←−− +a;n′a; b;n′b
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
+ . . . −−→ −{∣∣ks; a;nb; {|a; b;n′a; ks|}kas ∣∣}kbs
⇓ ... ⇓
+ {|a; b;n′a; ks|}kas ; {|n′a;nd; b|}ks −−→ −{|a; b;n′a; ks|}ka ; {|n′a;nd; b|}ks⇓
+ {|a; b;n′a; ks|}kas
... ⇓
−{|a; b;n′a; ks|}kas
I− trace ⇓ ...
+ {|k′s; b;n′a; {|m|}k|}kas −−→ −{|k′s; b;n′a; {|m|}k|}kas⇓ ⇓ ⇓
−{|m|}k ; {|n′b;n′d; a|}k′s ←−− + {|m|}k ; {|n
′
b;n
′
d; a|}k′s
I− trace ⇓
+ks; {|n′b;n′d; a|}k′s
... ⇓
−{|nd; a|}ks ←−− + {|nd; a|}ks
kdc b spy a
Figure 3: Type flaw attack in the KP-protocol in [36]
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5 Protocol Flaws
In this section, we will analyze the different types of flaws resulting in an insecure protocol. The
main source of such flaws in security protocols is that typically a protocol is not run in isolation, but
that there are, simultaneously, multiple run instances of the same protocol that might interfere
with each other. Typically, the penetrator carries out an attack on a protocol run, by reusing
information gathered from another run (or even from the same one). Hence, patching security
protocols is mostly concerned with disambiguating individual protocol messages in order to avoid
that a message in some protocol run can be misinterpreted either as another message at a different
protocol step, or as a message of the same protocol step but on a different protocol run. We start
with an investigation of how to find the steps in a protocol that cause the misuse of messages and
then we will discuss possible changes in the shape of such messages to avoid the confusion.
5.1 Locating the Reuse of Messages
In order to fix a protocol, we must analyze the input attack bundle of the protocol with the aim of
identifying the positions where messages, eavesdropped from one or more runs, are fed into some
others. So, in this section, we will provide the notation that is necessary to split an attack bundle
into strand sets representing the different protocol runs involved therein. We will also define the
notion of canonical bundle, which represents an ideal protocol run imposed by a set of given honest
strands. Comparing the message flow in the canonical bundle versus the attack bundle enables us
to determine the crucial steps in the protocol which cause the flawed behavior.
5.1.1 Roles and Protocol Participation
We start with the formal introduction of roles as a sort of generic strands. Roles are instantiated
to strands, by renaming generic atomic messages to specific elements in TK. We also consider
penetrator traces as roles.
Definition 5 (Roles) A role r is a pair 〈s, M 〉 of a strand s and M ⊆ TK of atomic messages
occurring in s. Intuitively, r denotes a strand s parameterized in M .
In abuse of notation we identify a role r with its strand s if M is the set of all atomic messages
occurring in s.
Definition 6 (I-th Step Execution of a Strand) Let r = 〈s, M 〉 be a role and let 1 ≤ i ≤
#(s). Then, a strand s′ is an instance of r, up to the execution of step i, iff there is a renaming
α of M , such that s′ = α(〈s, 1〉) ⇒ . . . ⇒ α(〈s, i〉). We denote the strand instance s′ of r up to
step i by r[i,α]. Let s′ = r[i,α]; whenever i = #(s), then s′ is said to be complete; otherwise, it
is said to be partial.
Given a set R of roles, then RH denotes the regular roles in R, and RP those of the penetrator.
Likewise, let T be a set of strand instances, then TH denotes all regular, possibly partial, strand
instances, and TP all the penetrator ones.
Example 5 The classical Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) protocol consists of two roles:
initiator role rInit : + {|a;n|}kb ⇒ −{|n;n′|}ka ⇒ + {|n′|}kb (12)
responder role rResp : −{|a;n|}kb ⇒ + {|n;n′|}ka ⇒ −{|n′|}kb (13)
Then, from these roles, we may obtain the following strand instances:
rInit [2, {a← a,n← n, ka ← ka, kb ← kb}] : + {|a;n|}kb ⇒ −{|n;n′|}ka
rResp [1, {a← a,n← n, kb ← kc}] : −{|a;n|}kc

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A bundle B is constructed from a set of roles, by combining various role instances with the
help of inter-strand communication, →. Hence, stripping off inter-strand communication from a
bundle, B, we end up with a multiset T of isolated instances of some roles.
Definition 7 (R-Bundles) Let R be a set of roles and T be a multiset of (possibly partial) strand
instances of roles in R. Then, B is a R-bundle out of T iff (i) each node in a strand of T is also a
node in B and vice versa, and (ii) n⇒ n′ iff n⇒B n′ for all nodes n,n′ of B (and T respectively).
We define a canonical bundle to be a bundle representing an intended run of a protocol. In a
canonical bundle, each role is instantiated by a strand exactly once, and each strand instance is
complete. Furthermore, the strands of a canonical bundle, and thereby the associated roles, are
all regular.
Definition 8 (Canonical Bundles) An R-bundle B out of T is canonical iff all roles in R
are regular and there is a symbol renaming α that is injective wrt. each role r ∈ R such that
T = {r[#(r),α] | r ∈ R}
Given a canonical R-bundle B we can easily retrieve R (up to isomorphism) from B (or T ) by
collecting all (renamed) strands occurring in B (or T , respectively).
Furthermore, we can consider each finite, acyclic graph B = 〈V , (→ ∪ ⇒)〉 as a canonical
R-bundle if for all v2 ∈ V sign(v2) = − implies that there is a unique v1 ∈ V with v1 → v2,
and that R is the set of all roles extracted from B. Later on, we use this property in order to
formulate changes of a protocol (i.e. changes of the roles of a protocol) simply by changing the
original canonical protocol and interpret the resulting graph as the canonical bundle of the new
protocol comprising also its new roles (up to isomorphism).
In what follows, we will use sans serif fonts to indicate messages in canonical bundles. Further-
more, we use the superscript c to denote a canonical bundle Bc, and the roles Rc or set of strand
instances T c of a canonical bundle. In the examples, we also assume that the honest roles of a
canonical bundle are normalized so that α = {}, and then write 〈r, i〉, instead of 〈r[#(r), {}], i〉.
To illustrate our ideas and definitions, we will make use of various protocols as running examples.
We first present canonical bundles of these protocols.
Example 6 We start with the NSPK protocol. Given the roles RcNSPK = {Init, Resp} of NSPK,
(12) and (13), we obtain the following canonical bundle, Bc:
+ {|a; n|}kb −−−−−−→ −{|a; n|}kb⇓ ⇓
−{|n; n′|}ka ←−−−−−− + {|n; n′|}ka⇓ ⇓
+ {|n′|}kb −−−−−−→ −{|n′|}kb
I nit Resp

Example 7 As another example, consider the Wide-Mouth-Frog (WMF) protocol. With RcWMF =
{Init, Serv, Resp}, the canonical bundle of this protocol is as follows:
+a, {|b; ta; k|}kas −→ −a, {|b; ta; k |}kas⇓
+ {|a; ta+d ; k|}kbs −→ −{|a; ta+d ; k |}kbs
I nit Serv Resp

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Example 8 As a third example, look into the Woo Lam authentication protocol:
+a; n −−→ −a; n
⇓ ⇓
−b; n′ ←−− +b; n′
⇓ ⇓
+
{∣∣a; b; n; n′∣∣}
kas
−−→ −{∣∣a; b; n; n′∣∣}
kas⇓
+
{∣∣a; b; n; n′∣∣}
kas
;
{∣∣a; b; n; n′∣∣}
kbs
−−→ −{∣∣a; b; n; n′∣∣}
kas
;
{∣∣a; b; n; n′∣∣}
kbs⇓ ⇓
−{∣∣b; n; n′; kab∣∣}kas ;{∣∣a; n; n′; kab∣∣}kbs ←−− +{∣∣b; n; n′; kab∣∣}kas ;{∣∣a; n; n′; kab∣∣}kbs⇓
−{∣∣b; n; n′; kab∣∣}kas ;{∣∣n; n′∣∣}kab ←−− +{∣∣b; n; n′; kab∣∣}kas ;{∣∣n; n′∣∣}kab
I nit Resp Serv

Example 9 Our last example is the Denning-Sacco-Shared Key (DSSK) protocol.
+a; b −−→ −a; b
⇓ ⇓
−
{∣∣∣b; kab ; ts ; {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ∣∣∣}kas ←−− +
{∣∣∣b; kab ; ts ; {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ∣∣∣}kas⇓
−{|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ←−− + {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs
Resp Init Serv

5.1.2 Characterizing the Perspective of each Participant in a Protocol Attack
Attacks detected by some security protocol analyzer typically involve different (partial) protocol
runs. Messages generated in one run are misused to fake messages in other runs. Since honest
principals only see the messages of a protocol that they receive or send, each principal develops his
own view on the protocol run. In the attack of the NSPK protocol, see Example 10, Alice assumes
she is communicating with Charly, while Bob thinks he is communicating with Alice. However,
both views are not compatible. In the following definition, we truss compatible strands of honest
principals to so-called protocol sections. While in a canonical bundle all honest strands belong to
a single protocol section, the attack bundle of NSPK consists of two protocol sections denoting
the (faked) protocol runs of Alice with Charly and Alice with Bob, respectively.
Definition 9 (Protocol Section) Let Bc be a canonical Rc-bundle out of some T c and let B be
an R-bundle out of some T .
A set T ′ ⊆ T is a protocol section wrt. Bc iff there is a renaming β such that, for all r[i,α′] ∈
T ′, there is one, and only one, r[#(r),α] ∈ T c, with α′ being a function denoting the composition
of β and α and subject to the domain TK(r). We call β the canonical renaming for T ′ wrt. Bc.
We call the mapping that maps each node of a regular strand 〈r[i,α′], j〉 in T ′ to the node
〈r[i,α], j〉 in Bc, for all r[i,α′] ∈ T ′ and 1 ≤ j ≤ i, the canonical mapping of T ′ to Bc.
Instantiation of roles
r r[#(r),α] r[i,α′]
role instance in
canonical bundle
instance in
a protocol section
α β
canonical mapping
of nodes
Figure 4: Relations of role instances
Fig. 4 illustrates the relations between roles and their instances in the canonical bundle and a
protocol section, respectively.
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Example 10 To exemplify all these notions, let us study again the attack on NSPK, illustrated
in the bundle shown below.
−k−1c ←− +k−1c
⇓
+ {|a;n|}kc −→ −{|a;n|}kc +kb −→ −kb
... ⇓ ⇓
+a;n −−−−−−−−−→ −a;n
⇓ ⇓
... + {|a;n|}kb −→ −{|a;n|}kb⇓
−{|n;n′|}ka ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− + {|n;n′|}ka
⇓ ...
−k−1c ←− +k−1c
⇓
+ {|n′|}kc −→ −{|n′|}kc +kb −→ −kb ⇓⇓ ⇓
+n′ −−−−−−→ −n′ ...
⇓
+ {|n′|}kb −→ −{|n′|}kb
Alice spy Bob
Besides the two roles of RNSPK, this bundle contains the penetrator traces (K), (E), and (D).
It is therefore an R-bundle, with R = {(K), (E), (D)} ∪ RNSPK. T consists of the six individual
strands occurring in the bundle.
Using the canonical bundle Bc given in Example 6, this attack bundle contains an instance
rinit [3,β] with β = {a ← a, b ← c, n ← n, n′ ← n′, ka ← ka, kb ← kc} and an instance rresp [3,β′]
with β′ = {a← a, b← b, n← n, n′ ← n′, ka ← ka, kb ← kb}. Both form individual protocol sections
T1 = {rinit [3,β]} and T2 = {rresp [3,β′]}. However, T3 = T1 ∪ T2 is not a protocol section, because
β and β′ are incompatible. 
Example 11 Concerning the WMF protocol (see Example 7) AVISPA [3] has found that it fails
to guarantee weak authentication of the responder, Bob, to the initiator, Alice, yielding the attack
bundle shown below:
+a, {|b; ta; k|}kas −→ −a, {|b; ta; k|}kas⇓
+a −→ −a
⇓
+ {|b; ta; k|}kas −−−−−−→ −{|b; ta; k|}kas
Alice(Init) spy Alice(Resp)
Comparing this attack bundle against the canonical one, Bc, shown in Example 7, we notice
that it contains instances for the initiator and responder strands, while the server is impersonated
by the penetrator: rinit [1,β] with β = {a ← a, b ← b, ta ← ta, kas ← kas} and rresp [1,β′] with
β′ = {a ← b, b ← a, ta ← ta, kbs ← kas}. Both strands form individual protocol sections, T1 =
{rinit [1,β]} and T2 = {rresp [1,β′]}. Again, T1∪T2 is not a protocol section, because βinit and βresp
are not compatible. 
Example 12 DSSK is vulnerable to a so-called multiplicity attack (see Section 6.3):
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+a; b −−→ −a; b
⇓ ⇓
−
{∣∣∣b; kab ; ts ; {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ∣∣∣}kas ←−− +
{∣∣∣b; kab ; ts ; {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ∣∣∣}kas⇓
−{|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ←−− + {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs⇓
−{|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ←−− + {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs⇓
−{|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ←−− + {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs
Resp Spy Init Serv

Thus, apart from penetrator activities, an attack bundle contains honest strands that operate
under different assumptions (captured by the specific elements in TK instantiating each strand).
This is in contrast with a canonical bundle, where all strands operate for the same run (pa-
rameters). A protocol section hence groups together all the honest strands in the attack bundle
operating under the same assumptions. This is the rationale that enables us to compute the min-
imal set of protocol sections which, together with the penetrator’s activities, constitutes a given
attack bundle.
Definition 10 (Coverage) Let B be an R-bundle out of some T and let Bc be a canonical Rc-
bundle with RH ⊆ Rc. A partition T1, . . . , Tk of TH is a coverage of T wrt. Bc iff each Ti is a
protocol section wrt. Bc. A coverage is optimal iff it is not a refinement of any other coverage.
The canonical mapping of B to Bc is the composition of the canonical mappings of T1, . . . , Tk to
Bc.
Example 13 Let us illustrate coverage through two examples. Go back to Example 10; there,
{T1, T2} is a coverage of T ; it is also optimal since T3 is not a protocol section. Now go back to the
attack bundle given in Example 12; then, we obtain an optimal coverage consisting of two protocol
sections: the first covers an instance of the entire canonical bundle, while the second consists only
of the second copy of the responder strand. 
5.1.3 The Misuse of Messages
In what follows, we characterize situations in which the penetrator confuses an honest principal,
by misusing an observed encrypted message. In a first step, we characterize the conditions under
which a honest principal will accept a received message, because it satisfies his expectations, as
formulated in the definition of the protocol.
Definition 11 (Acceptable Messages) Let m,m′ be messages, K a set of keys and V ars ⊂
TK(m) be a set of atomic messages in m. Then, m′ is accepted for m wrt. a renaming σ with
DOM(σ) ⊆ V ars and keys K , iff `K (m,m′,σ) according to the following rules:
`K (m,m, 〈〉) (Id)
`K (m,m′,σ)
if Dom(σ) ⊆ V ars∩TK(m) I(σ(m)) =
I(m′), and m ∈ V ars or m =
{|m′′|}k with k−1 6∈ K
(Sub)
`K (m1,m′1,σ1) `K (m2,m′2,σ2)
`K (m1;m2,m′,σ1 ◦ σ2)
if σ1,σ2 compatible and
I(m′) = I(m′1;m′2)
(Seq)
`K (k,m2,σ2) `K (m,m1,σ1)
`K ({|m|}k ,m′,σ1 ◦ σ2)
if σ1,σ2 compatible, and
I(m′) = I({|m1|}m2) with k−1 ∈ K (Enc)
We say m′ is accepted for m wrt. atoms V ars and keys K if there is a renaming σ with DOM(σ) ⊆
V ars such that m′ is accepted for m wrt. σ and K .
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Example 14 For example, consider again the attack to the NSPK protocol (see Example 10). For
the sake of simplicity, assume that I is the identity function. In the second step of her strand,
Alice, a, expects a message m = {|na;nb|}ka . Suppose she receives m′ = {|na;nc|}ka , then we can
derive:
−
`K (ka, ka, 〈〉) Id
−
`K (na,na, 〈〉) Id
−
`K (nb,nc, 〈nb ← nc〉) Sub
`K (na;nb,na;nc, 〈nb ← nc〉) Seq
`K ({|na;nb|}ka , {|na;nc|}ka , 〈nb ← nc〉)
Enc

Example 15 As a second example, consider now the type flaw attack on the flawed Woo Lam pi1
protocol, given in Example 2 (see Example 2). In step 3 of his strand, Bob, b, expects a message of
the form {|a; b;nb|}kas , but receives nb instead. According to our definition, b will accept nb provided
that there is an instantiation σ for nb and kas such that I(σ({|a; b;nb|}kas)) = I(nb). Assuming
b takes the key kas to be k, then we would infer the following conditions as those under which b
accepts nb as a legal message:
−
`K (k, k, 〈〉) Id
−
`K (a, a, 〈〉) Id
−
`K (b, b, 〈〉) Id
`K (a; b, a; b, 〈〉) Seq
−
`K (nb,m′3, 〈nb ← m′3〉)
Seq
`K (a; b;nb, a; b;m′3, 〈nb ← m′3〉)) Enc
`K ({|a; b;nb|}k ,nb, 〈nb ← m′3〉)
Enc
which holds, provided that there are messages m′,m′1,m
′
2,m
′
3 such that I(a) = I(m′1), I(b) = I(m′2),
and I(m′) = I(m′1;m′2;m′3), I({|m′|}k) = I({|a; b;m′3|}k) and I(nb) = I({|m′|}k) holds. 
Now, an obvious misuse is that the penetrator sees an encrypted message in a protocol run and
reuses it in another run, but in the same step. We can easily detect this case, by comparing the
protocol sections of the node where the message is originating and the node where the message
is received by the honest principal. We call such a situation a cross-protocol-confusion. Another
misuse is to use some encrypted message observed in a run to camouflage another message of a
different step (but possibly in the same run), because they coincide in their structure. In order
to detect this new situation, we compare the attack bundle with the canonical bundle and check
whether the encrypted message in the attack bundle and its counterpart in the canonical bundle
originate at corresponding message positions. We call this alternative situation message confusion.
The definition below captures our intuition of the misuse of messages; it makes use of the
standard notion of message position, which is an address represented by a string. Roughly, the
subterm of m, at position pi, m|pi, is captured as follows: m| = m, f(m1, . . . ,mk)|i · p = mi|p,
where  and · respectively stand for the empty string, and string concatenation. We use m[pi ← m′]
to denote the message that results from replacing m|pi with m′ in m.
Definition 12 (Confusion) Let B be an R-bundle out of some T , Bc be a canonical Rc-bundle
with RH ⊆ Rc. Let C be an optimal coverage of T wrt. Bc and θ be the corresponding canonical
mapping. Then, there is a confusion in a honest node v ∈ B iff there is a position pi of v with
{|m|}k = msg(v)|pi, originating in an honest node v′ ∈ B, at some position pi′ of msg(v′), such that
either:
• v and v′ are located on strands of different protocol sections, giving rise to a cross-protocol
confusion and v ∈ B causing the cross-protocol confusion with {|m|}k, or
• msg(θ(v))|pi does not originate in θ(v′) or EQBc(θ(v′)) 6 ` I(msg(θ(v′))|pi′) = I(msg(θ(v))|pi),
giving rise to a message confusion and v ∈ B causing the message confusion with {|m|}k.
Example 16 In the NSPK attack bundle (see Example 10), there is only one node that gives
rise to a confusion. While both {|a;n|}kb and {|n′|}kb originate on a penetrator strand, {|n,n′|}ka
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originates on 〈rresp [3,β′], 2〉. This latter message is later received in 〈rinit [3,β], 2〉, which belongs
to a different protocol section. Hence, there is a cross-protocol confusion in 〈rinit [3,β], 2〉. There
is not a message confusion, because {|n,n′|}ka originates in θ(〈rresp [3,β′], 2〉) = 〈rresp , 2〉 of the
canonical bundle at position root. Notice also that ∅ ` {|n,n′|}ka = {|n,n′|}ka holds. 
Example 17 In the Woo Lam pi1 attack bundle (see Example 2), the principal b receives an
encrypted message in 〈rresp [5,β], 5〉, which originates in 〈rresp [5,β], 4〉. This is different to the
canonical bundle, where msg(〈rresp , 5〉) originates at 〈rserv , 2〉. Thus, there is a message confusion
in 〈rresp [5,β], 5〉. 
Example 18 In the WMF protocol attack bundle (see Example 11), there is both a message
confusion and a cross-protocol confusion in 〈rresp [1,β′], 1〉. 
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+a;n −−→ −a;n
⇓ ⇓
+c;n −−→ −c;n
⇓ ⇓
−a;n′ ← +a;n′
⇓ ⇓
−c;n′ ←−− +c;n′
⇓ ⇓
+
{∣∣a, c,n,n′∣∣}
kas
−−→ −{∣∣a, c,n,n′∣∣}
kas⇓ ⇓
−{∣∣a, c,n,n′∣∣}
kas
;
{∣∣a, c,n,n′∣∣}
kcs
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− +{∣∣a, c,n,n′∣∣}
kas
;
{∣∣a, c,n,n′∣∣}
kcs⇓ ⇓
+
{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kas ;{∣∣a;n;n′; kac∣∣}kcs −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ −{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kas ;{∣∣a;n;n′; kac∣∣}kcs⇓ ⇓
−{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kas ;{∣∣n,n′∣∣}kac ←−− +{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kas ;{∣∣n,n′∣∣}kac⇓ ⇓
+
{∣∣n′∣∣}
kac
−−→ −{∣∣n′∣∣}
kac⇓ ⇓
+
{∣∣c; a;n;n′∣∣}
kcs
−−→ −{∣∣c; a;n;n′∣∣}
kcs⇓ ⇓
−{∣∣c; a;n;n′∣∣}
kcs
;
{∣∣c, a,n,n′∣∣}
kas
←−− +{∣∣c; a;n;n′∣∣}
kcs
;
{∣∣c, a,n,n′∣∣}
kas⇓ ⇓
+
{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kcs ;{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kas −−→ −{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kcs ;{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kas⇓ ⇓
−{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kcs ;{∣∣n;n′∣∣}kac ←−− +{∣∣c;n;n′; kac∣∣}kcs ;{∣∣n;n′∣∣}kac⇓ ⇓
+
{∣∣n′∣∣}
kac
−−→ −{∣∣n′∣∣}
kac
Server Alice(Init) spy Alice(Resp)
Figure 5: The attack bundle for the Woo Lam authentication protocol
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Example 19 In the attack bundle to the Woo Lam authentication protocol (see Fig. 5), there
are several nodes in which honest principals receive encrypted messages. There is no confu-
sion in 〈rserv [2,β], 1〉, because (i) {|a;n;n′; kac|}kcs originates on a penetrator strand, and (ii){|c;n;n′; kac|}kas originates in 〈rInit [5,β], 3〉 in the same protocol section, and analogously to the
canonical bundle. Similar arguments hold for 〈rInit [5,β], 4〉 and 〈rResp [7,β′], 4〉.
A cross-protocol confusion occurs in 〈rResp [7,β′], 5〉, because the encrypted message {|c;n;n′; kac|}kas
originates in 〈rserv [2,β], 2〉, which is situated in a different protocol section. It is also a message
confusion. Although the encrypted message {|c;n;n′; kac|}kas originates in the attack bundle at〈rserv [2,β], 2〉, which corresponds to 〈rserv , 2〉 in the canonical bundle, the positions in which they
occur differ. 
5.2 Limits of Changing Messages to Protocol Fix
We now deal with the situation in which an attacker has already been able to trick an honest
principal into accepting a message m′, instead of an expected message, m, for a given protocol.
Therefore, we want to change the protocol in such a way that the attacker is no longer able either to
construct m′ from a collection of eavesdropped messages, or to pass m′ as a camouflaged message
for m. To formalize this idea, we first introduce the following definitions.
Definition 13 (Agents Knowledge) Let s be a strand of a bundle B. Further, let TKInit and
KInit respectively be the set of atomic messages in s and the set of keys, initially known to the
agent of s. In particular, TKInit includes all atomic messages that are originating in s.
Given a node 〈s, i〉 of s then pred(〈s, i〉) is the closest negative predecessor node of 〈s, i〉, if
any, and it is undefined, otherwise; i.e. if ∀1 ≤ j < i. sign(〈s, j〉 = +.
The set of known keys K〈s,i〉 in a negative node 〈s, i〉, with i ≤ #(s), is defined by:
K〈s,i〉 =
{
KInit if pred(〈s, i〉) undefined,
Kpred(〈s,i〉) ∪ (analz Kpred(〈s,i〉)(〈s, i〉)) otherwise.
(14)
and the set of known atomic messages TK〈s,i〉 in a negative node 〈s, i〉, with i ≤ #(s), by:
TK〈s,i〉 =
{
TKInit if pred(〈s, i〉) undefined,
TKpred(〈s,i〉) ∪ TK(analz Kpred(〈s,i〉)({msg(〈s, i〉)})) otherwise.
(15)
Now, if a protocol has to be changed in order to avoid confusions, there are two opposing
requirements. On the one hand, we would like to add additional information into individual
messages to allow the recipient to distinguish the original from the faked message. But, on the
other hand, we would not like to change the intended semantics of the protocol. Our approach is
not based on any explicit semantics of the protocols under consideration, but the semantics is only
implicitly given by the syntactical design of the protocol. When changing steps of the protocol
syntactically, we ought to make sure that the implicit semantics of the protocol is not changed
either. We try to achieve this goal by changing individual protocol steps only using conservative
extensions and reshuffles of messages.
Suppose, for example, that to patch a protocol, we need to modify an encrypted term, t.
Clearly, upon the reception of t, a principal can decompose it into the subterms that are visible
under some known keys, K . When patching a protocol by modifying t into t′, we further require
that, under K , t′ exposes at least the same information to the principal as t.
Definition 14 (Message Substitution) A message substitution σ is a finite list 〈{|t1|}k1 ←{|t′1|}k1 , . . . , {|tn|}kn ← {|t′n|}kn〉 of pairs of encrypted messages, such that {|ti|}ki = {|tj |}kj =⇒ i =
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j. As expected, we define Dom(σ) = {{|t1|}k1 , . . . , {|tn|}kn}. Given t ∈ A, σ(t) is defined by:
σ(t) =

t if t ∈ TK
σ(t1);σ(t2) if t = t1; t2
{|σ(t′i)|}ki if t = {|ti|}ki , {|ti|}ki ∈ Dom(σ)
{|σ(t′)|}k if t = {|t′|}k , {|t′|}k 6∈ Dom(σ)
(16)
We extend message substitition σ also to sets M of messages by σ(M ) = {σ(t)|t ∈ M }.
Example 20 Let σ = {{|A; {|B|}K |}K ← {|{|B|}K ;A;C|}K , {|B|}K ← {|B;D|}K} then
σ({|A; {|B|}K |}K ; {|B|}K) = {|{|B;D|}K ;A;C|}K ; {|B;D|}K . 
Definition 15 A message substitution σ is information enhancing wrt. a set M of messages iff
∀ {|ti|}ki ∈ Dom(σ). ∃M ′ ⊆ M . fl(t′i) = fl(ti) ∪M ′. A message substitution σ is injective on a set
M of messages iff ∀t, t′ ∈ M . σ(t) = σ(t′) =⇒ t = t′.
Example 21 The message substitution σ in Example 20 is information enhancing wrt. {C,D}.

Definition 16 Let σ1, σ2 be two message substitutions with Dom(σ1) ∩Dom(σ2) = ∅. Then the
co-substitutions σ1 and σ2 of σ1, σ2 are defined by:
σ1 = {σ2(t)← σ2(t′) | t← t′ ∈ σ1} and σ2 = {σ1(t)← σ1(t′) | t← t′ ∈ σ2}
Lemma 17 Let σ1 and σ2 be two information enhancing message substitutions wrt. M1 and M2,
respectively, such that Dom(σ1) ∩Dom(σ2) = ∅. Then, the co-substitutions σ1 and σ2 of σ1 and
σ2 are information enhancing wrt. σ2(M1) and σ1(M2), respectively.
Proof We prove that σ2 is information enhancing wrt. σ1(M2); the proof for σ1 is analogous. Let
σ2 = 〈{|s1|}k1 ← {|s′1|}k1 , . . . , {|sn|}kn ← {|s′n|}kn〉 then σ2 = 〈σ1({|s1|}k1)← σ1({|s′1|}k1), . . . ,σ1({|sn|}kn)←
σ1({|s′n|}kn)〉. Since σ2 is information enhancing wrt. M2, we know that fl(s′i) = fl(si) ∪M2 and
therefore also σ1(fl(s
′
i)) = σ1(fl(si) ∪M2) = σ1(fl(si)) ∪ σ1(M2). Because σ1 commutes over flat-
tening, we obtain: fl(σ1(s
′
i)) = fl(σ1(si)) ∪ σ1(M2). 
Lemma 18 Let σ1, σ2 be two information enhancing message substitutions wrt. M1 and M2,
respectively, such that Dom(σ1) ∩ Dom(σ2) = ∅. Let M ⊆ A be a set of messages, such that σ1
and σ2 are injective on M . Then there are information enhancing message substitutions σ1 and
σ2 wrt. σ2(M1) and σ1(M2) such that
∀t ∈ M . σ1(σ2(t)) = σ2(σ1(t))
Proof Let σ1 and σ2 be the corresponding co-substitutions of σ1 and σ2. By Lemma 17 we
know that σ1 and σ2 are information enhancing message substitutions wrt. σ2(M1) and σ1(M2),
respectively.
We prove the push-out by structural induction on the term t: Since σ1 and σ2 are injective
on M , we know that t 6∈ Dom(σ1) implies σ2(t) 6∈ Dom(σ1), and t 6∈ Dom(σ2) implies σ1(t) 6∈
Dom(σ2), for all t ∈ M .
• Let t ∈ TK then σ1(σ2(t)) = t = σ2(σ1(t)).
• Let t = t1; t2 then σ1(σ2(t1; t2)) = σ1(σ2(t1));σ1(σ2(t2)) = σ2(σ1(t1; t2)).
• Let t ∈ Dom(σ1). Hence, t = {|ti|}ki and σ1(t) = {|t′i|}ki . Furthermore, t 6∈ Dom(σ2)
and therefore σ1(t) 6∈ Dom(σ2). Then σ2(σ1(t)) = σ2({|σ1(t′i)|}ki) = {|σ2(σ1(t′i))|}ki ={|σ1(σ2(t′i))|}ki = σ1({|σ2(ti)|}ki) = σ1(σ2({|ti|}ki)) = σ1(σ2(t)).
• Let t ∈ Dom(σ2). Analogous to the previous case.
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• Let t = {|t′|}k 6∈ Dom(σ1) ∪ Dom(σ2). Then σ2(σ1(t)) = σ2({|σ1(t′)|}k) = {|σ2(σ1(t′))|}k =
{|σ1(σ2(t′))|}k = σ1({|σ2(t′)|}k) = σ1(σ2({|t′|}k)). 
Definition 19 (Message Enhancement) Let m,m′ be two messages and M be a set of atomic
messages. m′ is an enhancement of m wrt. M , written m′ ≥M m for short, iff there is an
information enhancing message substitution σ wrt. M , such that σ(m) = m′ holds.
We write m′ ≥M ,σ m to identify the corresponding information enhancing message substitution
σ with σ(m) = m′.
We say that m is equivalent to m′, in symbols m ≡ m′, iff m ≥∅ m′. Furthermore, m >M ,σ m′
iff m ≥M ,σ m′ and m 6≡ m′.
Example 22 {|a; b;m|}kas ≡ {|m; a; b|}kas . 
We shall also demand that the changed message be dissimilar from an entire set of messages,
e.g. from those used in one or more protocols.
Definition 20 (Collision Freeness) Let m be a message and M ⊆ A be a set of messages.
Then, m is collision free with respect to M iff for all m′ ∈M it is the case that m 6≡ m′.
5.3 Protocol Repair
We have seen that we find bugs in protocols by analyzing a bundle containing a penetrator strand.
Often, our analysis suggests a change in the structure of a message, and, in that case, it identifies
the node originating such message considering a bundle denoting an intended protocol run. With
this, we compute the changes to be done in one such a regular bundle, which are then propagated
to the protocol description. The following definitions aim at a meta-theory to allow for tracing
the consequences of changing all the nodes in the set of strands caused by a change in a particular
node.
Definition 21 (Adaptation) Let B be a bundle, v0 be a positive node in B and σ be a message
substitution. The adaptation Ad(B, v0,σ) of B wrt. v0 and σ is a graph B′ that is isomorphic to
B; we shall use ζ to denote the corresponding isomorphism that maps the nodes of B to nodes of
B′. The message of each node in B′ is defined by msg(ζ(v)) = msg(v) if v0 6B v and msg(ζ(v)) =
σ(msg(v)) otherwise.
Suppose B is an R-bundle, then the adaptation Ad(B, v0,σ) can be considered as a canonical
R′-bundle where R′ is the set of renamed strands embedded in Ad(B, v0,σ) (c.f. Section 5.1.1).
Definition 22 An adaptation Ad(B, v0,σ) of a canonical bundle is safe iff Dom(σ) originates in
v0 and σ is information enhancing.
Lemma 23 (Confluence of Adaptations) Let B be a bundle, v1, v2 nodes of B and σ1,σ2 in-
formation enhancing message substitutions such that Dom(σ1) ∩Dom(σ2) = ∅ and Ad(B, vi,σi)
(i = 1, 2) are safe adaptations. Let ζi be their corresponding node isomorphisms then
Ad(Ad(B, v1,σ1), ζ1(v2),σ2) = Ad(Ad(B, v2,σ2), ζ2(v1),σ1)
holds where σ1,σ2 are the corresponding co-substitutions of σ1,σ2.
Proof Let ζ1 (and ζ2) be the corresponding node isomorphisms for Ad(Ad(B, v1,σ1), ζ1(v2),σ2)
(and Ad(Ad(B, v2,σ2), ζ2(v1),σ1), repectively). We show that msg(ζ1(ζ2(v))) = msg(ζ2(ζ1(v)))
holds for each node v of B. Obviously vk 6B v implies ζi(vk) 6B ζi(v) and also ζj(ζi(vk)) 6B
ζj(ζi(v)) for i, j, k = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Let v an arbitrary node of B. We do a case analysis on the position of v relative to v1 and v2:
• Let v1 6B v and v2 6B v. Then, msg(ζ1(ζ2(v))) = msg(v) = msg(ζ2(ζ1(v))).
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• Let v1 6B v and v2 B v. Then, msg(ζ1(v)) = msg(v) and msg(ζ2(v)) = σ2(msg(v)). Thus
msg(ζ1(ζ2(v))) = msg(ζ2(v)) = σ2(msg(ζ1(v))) = msg(ζ2(ζ1(v)))
• Let v2 6B v and v1 B v. Then, msg(ζ2(v)) = msg(v) and msg(ζ1(v)) = σ1(msg(v)). Thus
msg(ζ1(ζ2(v))) = σ1(msg(ζ2(v))) = msg(ζ1(v)) = msg(ζ2(ζ1(v)))
• Let v2 B v and v1 B v. Then, msg(ζ1(v)) = σ1(msg(v)) and msg(ζ2(v)) = σ2(msg(v)).
Thus, msg(ζ1(ζ2(v))) = σ1(msg(ζ2(v))) = σ1(σ2(msg(v))) = σ2(σ1(msg(v))) = σ2(msg(ζ1(v))) =
msg(ζ2(ζ1(v)))
6 Patch Methods for Protocols
In their seminar paper, [1] Abadi and Needham proposed general guidelines for a protocol design,
which cope with the problem of disambiguating messages in a protocol. In particular, the principle
3, agent naming, prescribes that all agent names relevant for a message should be derivable either
from the format of the message or from its content. This prevents the reuse of a message in the
corresponding step of a different run of the same protocol. Principle 10, recognizing messages and
encodings, deals with the second source of misuse and demands that a principal should be able to
associate which step a message corresponds to. These principles will result in different ways to fix
a flawed protocol.
We shall now discuss various rules to fix a faulty protocol. As already illustrated in Section 2,
we use a standard protocol analyzer, like AVISPA, to generate an example of an interleaving of
protocol runs in which a honest principal has been spoofed. This example is translated into the
strand space notation forming an attack bundle B. Additionally, we translate the intended protocol
run into a canonical bundle Bc. Comparing both bundles provides the necessary information where
and how we have to change the protocol. The first step is to construct a coverage for B, representing
the different views of the honest principals on the protocol runs of the attack. The ultimate goal is
to remove all confusions occurring in B by small changes of individual protocol steps. Therefore,
we will analyze the various sources for confusions and how they can be avoided by patching the
protocol. The type of patch rule used depends on the type of confusion (c.f. Definition 12).
A rule (to patch a protocol) is a patch method, a tuple comprising four elements: i) a name, ii)
an input, iii) preconditions, and iv) a patch. The first element is the name of the method, a string,
meaningful to the flaw repair performed by the method. The second element is the input : a bundle
B describing the attack, a canonical bundle Bc describing the intended run of the protocol, and
a distinguished node in B causing a confusion. The third element is the preconditions, a formula
written in a meta-logic that the input objects must satisfy. Shrimp uses these preconditions to
predict whether the associated patch will make the protocol no longer susceptible to the attack.
Finally, the fourth element is the patch, a procedure specifying how to mend the input protocol.
6.1 Patching Protocols with a Message Confusion Flaw
Suppose that a given attack bundle B has a message confusion in some node v ∈ B. This means
that a honest principal accepted a message in some step of the protocol that was faked by the
penetrator. Since the confusion is fatal, the penetrator reused some encrypted message from
another message (possibly from a different protocol step) that he could not construct himself.
Hence, the problem is that the encrypted messages within the reused message can be confused
with the encrypted message that is part of the expected message. To fix this vulnerability we
have to change one of these messages to break the similarity. The simplest way of doing this is
to rearrange the information stored in the message. For instance, we may reverse messages of a
concatenation occurring in msg(v). In general, we search for a message m such that msg(v) ≡ m,
but msg(v) 6= m. In some cases, and in particular if msg(v) simply is an encrypted atomic
message, there are no messages m satisfying these conditions, and we have to extend msg(v) with
an additional information bit, typically a tag, to resolve the confusion.
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Definition 24 (Message-Encoding Rule) The message-encoding rule is the following trans-
formation rule:
Input: Bc, B with a node v ∈ B causing a message confusion with a message t = msg(v)|pi
Preconditions:
i) msg(θ(v))|pi originates at v′ in Bc at position pi′,
ii) v belongs to a protocol section with renaming β
Patch:
Let t′ be a message and B′c a graph such that
i) σ = {msg(v′)|pi′ ← t′} is an information enhancing message substitution wrt. TKv′ ,
ii) t′ is collision free wrt. msg(v′′) for all nodes v′′ in Bc, and
iii) msg(v) is not accepted for β(σ(msg(θ(v)))) wrt. TKv and the known keys Kv in v.
Then, return Ad(Bc, v′,σ) as a result of the patch.
Example 23 Consider again WMF, which violates Abadi and Needham’s design principle 10. As
illustrated in the attack of Example 11, Alice receives the encrypted message t = {|b; ta; k|}kas in
v = 〈rresp [1,β′], 1〉 which originates in 〈rinit [1,β], 1〉. In the canonical bundle, however, the cor-
responding message {|a; ta+d; k|}kbs originates in v′ = 〈rServ , 2〉. which causes a message confusion
with t. Therefore, the preconditions of the patch are applicable and we are looking for a message
t′ such that σ = {{|a; ta+d; k|}kbs ← m′} is an information enhancing message substitution wrt.
TKθ(v′) = {a, b, ta, k}. Now, suppose that the implementation of two messages are equal if and
only if the messages are equal. We obtain a suitable message t′ = {|ta+d; a; k|}kbs , by permuting
the messages of t. t′ is obviously collision free with all nodes of the canonical bundle Bc and
{|b; ta; k|}kas is not accepted for {|ta; b; k|}kas wrt. {ta, b} and {kas}.
The resulting bundle Ad(Bc, v′,σ) looks as follows (cf. the original definition, given in Exam-
ple 7):
+a, {|b; ta; k |}kas −→ −a, {|b; ta; k |}kas⇓
+ {|ta+d ; a; k|}kbs −→ −{|ta+d ; a; k|}kbs
I nit Serv Resp

Example 24 In case of the Woo Lam pi1 protocol (see Example 2), there is a message confusion
in v = 〈rresp [5,β], 5〉 with t = {|a; b;nb|}kbs , t originates in 〈rresp [5,β], 4〉 while in the canonical
bundle the corresponding message {|a; b; nb|}kbs originates in v′ = 〈rServ , 2〉 at top level.
Again, we obtain a suitable message t′ = b; a; nb by permuting the messages of t such that σ =
{t ← t′} is an information enhancing message substitution wrt. TKθ(v′). t′ is obviously collision
free with all nodes of the canonical bundle Bc and {|a; b;nb|}kbs is not accepted for {|b; a;nb|}kbs wrt.∅ and {kbs}.
Thus, the resulting bundle Ad(Bc, v′,σ) looks as follows:
+a −→ −a
⇓ ⇓
−nb ←− +nb
⇓ ⇓
+ {|a; b; nb|}kas −→ −{|a; b; nb|}kas⇓
+{|a; b; {|a; b; nb|}kas |}kbs −→ −{|a; b; {|a; b; nb|}kas |}kbs⇓ ⇓
−{|b; a; nb|}kbs ←− + {|b; a; nb|}kbs
I nit Resp Serv

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Notice that the intruder can elaborate a type flaw attack on a protocol whenever he is able
to make a protocol principal accept a message of one type, m, as a message of another, m′. In
that case, m and m′ share the same implementation, m ≈ m′. Thus, to remove the protocol
type flaw, it suffices to break m ≈ m′. So message-encoding will attempt this by rearranging
m’s structure while keeping its meaning intact. If this operation does not suffice to break the
confusion between m and m′, it will then insert into m vacuous terms, tags actually, as in [20].
Finally, when incurring on these changes, our methods ensure that the new protocol message does
not clash with some other.
6.2 Patching Protocols with a Cross-Protocol Confusion Flaw
Protocol guarantees are usually implemented via cyphertexts (c.f. the rationale behind an authen-
tication test [18]). To realize authentication, the name of the agents that are relevant for the
intended consumption of a cyphertext, namely the originator and the intended recipients, should
be all derivable from the cyphertext itself (c.f. principle 3 for protocol design of Abadi and Need-
ham [1]). When this is not the case, the associated message, and the protocol itself, has agent
naming problems.
When an agent naming problem occurs, a penetrator can reuse the message corresponding to
the i-th step of the protocol in some run, to camouflage that of the i-th step but of another run.
Thus, the penetrator reuses one or more associated message cyphertexts so as to impersonate
the corresponding originator or as to redirect them to an unintended recipient. From a technical
point of view, such a message lacks sufficient information about the particular protocol run it was
generated for.
We introduce a method designed to fix a faulty protocol with a cross-protocol confusion flaw.
We fix this flaw inserting the names of the correspondents that are not explicitly mentioned in the
message that has been reused to carry out the attack.
Definition 25 (Agent-Naming Rule) The agent-naming rule is the following transformation
rule:
Input: Bc, B with a node v ∈ B causing a cross-protocol but not a message confusion with a
message t.
Preconditions:
i) t originates in v′ ∈ B at position pi,
ii) v belongs to a protocol section with renaming β, and
iii) v′ belongs to a protocol section with renaming β′, with β 6= β′
Patch:
Let t′ be a message such that
i) σ = {msg(θ(v′))|pi ← t′} is an information enhancing message substitution wrt. {m ∈
TKθ(v′) | β′(m) 6= β(m)},
ii) t′ is collision free wrt. msg(v′′) for all nodes v′′ in Bc,
Then, return Ad(Bc, θ(v′),σ) as a result of the patch.
Example 25 Consider the NSPK protocol in Example 10. There is a cross-protocol confusion
(but not a message confusion) in 〈rinit [3,β], 2〉 with t = {|n;n′|}ka . The different protocol sections
have the following renamings: β = {a ← a, b ← c, n ← n, n′ ← n′, ka ← ka, kb ← kc} and β′ =
{a← a, b← b, n← n, n′ ← n′, ka ← ka, kb ← kb}. Thus, pi is empty and msg(θ(v′))|pi = {|n; n′|}ka .
Obviously, β and β′ differ only5 in their renaming of the atomic message b, which results in
a patched message t′ = {|n; n′; b|}ka that is to be expected in 〈rinit [3,β], 2〉. Therefore, we adjust
the protocol using σ = {{|n; n′|}ka ← {|n; n′; b|}ka} and obtain the fixed protocol (cf. the original
5Notice that we are not interested in adding agent keys to a message for obvious reasons.
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definition, given in Example 6) by Ad(Bc, θ(v′),σ):
+ {|a; n|}kb −−−−−−→ −{|a; n|}kb⇓ ⇓
−{|n; n′; b|}ka ←−−−−−− + {|n; n′; b|}ka⇓ ⇓
+ {|n′|}kb −−−−−−→ −{|n′|}kb
I nit Resp

6.3 Patching Protocols with a Replay Protection Flaw
The agent-naming rule fails to patch a protocol if the set {m ∈ TKv′ | β(m) 6= β′(m)} is empty,
which means that there are two identical copies of an honest strand in the penetrator bundle con-
tributing to different protocol runs. In other words, the behavior of this principal is deterministic
with respect to the messages received from its environment. This gives rise to a multiplicity attack
in which the penetrator simply replays a communication from a (pre-)recorded protocol run, and
causes an agent to consider that somebody is trying to set up a simultaneous session, when he is
not [26].
The session-binding rule deals with faulty protocols that contain this kind of flaw, called replay
protection. Two example faulty protocols of this kind are WMF (c.f. Example 7) and DSSK
(c.f. Example 9) protocol. None of these protocols satisfies strong authentication of B to A, Both
prescribe the responder, b, to react upon an unsolicited test [18].
In both cases, the responder b participates in the protocol only in a passive way, by receiving
some message. Unless the responder stores details about each protocol run, it cannot distinguish
copies of such a message replayed by an attacker, from genuine messages in independent protocol
runs. Technically speaking, there are no atoms that originate on the responder strand allowing it
to actively differentiate individual protocol runs. Shrimp is equipped with a repair method that
introduces a nonce-flow requirement to fix this flaw [1, 35, 26, 18] (c.f. principle 7 for protocol
design of Abadi and Needham.) The idea is to use some handshake or challenge-response approach
to involve the responder actively in the protocol.
Definition 26 (Session-Binding Rule) The session-binding rule is the following transforma-
tion rule:
Input:
Bc, B with a node v ∈ B causing a cross-protocol but not a message confusion with a message
{|m|}k.
Preconditions:
i) v belongs to a protocol section T with renaming β,
ii) v′ belongs to a protocol section T ′ with renaming β and T ′ 6= T , and
iii) {|m|}k originates in v′ ∈ B at position pi.
Patch: Introduce a challenge-response between the strand s of θ(v) and the strand s′ of v′′,
where v′′ is a minimal element wrt. Bc in {v | v Bc θ(v)}.
Return a bundle B′ = 〈V ′, (→′ ∪ ⇒′)〉 with:
i) V ′ = VBc ∪ {v1, v2, v3, v4},
ii) →′ =→Bc ∪{(v1, v3), (v2, v4)},
iii) ⇒′ =⇒Bc ∪{(〈s, #s〉, v1), (v1, v2), (〈s′, #s′〉, v3), (v3, v4)},
iv) msg(v1) = msg(v3) = {|Agent(v1); Agent(v3);n|}k, and
v) msg(v2) = msg(v4) = {|f(n); Agent(v3); Agent(v1)|}k−1 .
where n is a nonce originating in v1, f is an arbitrary injective function on nonces, and
either k = k−1 ∈ K〈s,#s〉 ∩ K〈s′,#s′〉 \ KP , or k and k−1 are the public and private key of
Agent(v3).
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Obviously, this patch solves the problem of having identical copies of the same honest strand
s in a penetrator bundle. Since the newly introduced nonce originates in s, it also uniquely
originates in a faithful realization of the protocol; i.e. the honest principal will generate individual
(i.e. different) nonces for each individual protocol run.
Example 26 Consider the patched Wide-Mouth-Frog protocol in Example 23. After eliminating
the message confusion there is still an attack possible as illustrated in the following penetrator
bundle. As Lowe [26] has described the attack, the penetrator impersonates the server and replays
the server’s response making the responder to believe that a second session has been established.
+a, {|ta; b; k|}kas −→ −a, {|ta; b; k|}kas⇓
+ {|a; ta+d; k|}kbs −→ −{|a; ta+d; k|}kbs⇓
+ {|a; ta+d; k|}kbs −→ −{|a; ta+d; k|}kbs⇓
+ {|a; ta+d; k|}kbs −→ −{|a; ta+d; k|}kbs
Init Serv Spy Resp
Obviously, there is a cross-protocol confusion in the first node of the second responder strand with
the message {|a; ta+d; k|}kbs . The responder strands belong to different protocol sections; however,
both agree in their renamings β, β′ of the canonical bundle. This prevents the application of the
agent-naming rule and enables the application of the session-binding rule. 〈Init , 1〉 is the only
Bc-minimal element of {v | v Bc 〈Resp, 1〉} and we choose to use the increment by one as f .
K〈Init,1〉 ∩K〈Resp,1〉 \KP = {k, kas} ∩ {k, kbs} = {k}. Hence, we select k as the encryption key for
the challenge response and we obtain the following patched canonical bundle:
+a, {|ta; b; k|}kas −→ −a, {|ta; b; k|}kas⇓
⇓ + {|a; ta+d ; k |}kbs −→ −{|a; ta+d ; k|}kbs⇓
−{|a; b; nb|}k ←−−−−−−−−− + {|a; b; nb|}k
⇓ ⇓
+ {|nb + 1; b; a|}k −−−−−−−−−→ −{|nb + 1; b; a|}k
I nit Serv Resp

Example 27 As another example consider the attack on the DSSK protocol in Example 12. Again
we have two identical copies of the responder strand. Similar to the previous example, there is cross-
protocol confusion in the first node of the second responder strand with the message {|b; kab; a; ts|}kbs .
Again, 〈Init , 1〉 is the only Bc-minimal element of {v | v Bc 〈Resp, 1〉} and we choose to use
the increment by one as f . With K〈Init,3〉 ∩ K〈Resp,1〉 \ KP = {kab, kas} ∩ {kab, kbs} = {kab} we
choose kab as the encryption key and obtain the following patched DSSK protocol:
+a; b −−→ −a; b
⇓ ⇓
−
{∣∣∣b; kab ; ts ; {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ∣∣∣}kas ←−− +
{∣∣∣b; kab ; ts ; {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ∣∣∣}kas⇓
−{|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs ←−− + {|b; kab ; a; ts |}kbs⇓ ⇓
+ {|a; b; nb|}kab −−→ −{|a; b; nb|}kab⇓ ⇓
−{|nb + 1; b; a|}kab ←−− + {|nb + 1; b; a|}kab
Resp Init Serv

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6.4 Combining Rules
As already mentioned in Section 5.3, our approach runs a protocol verifier and uses its output,
in particular the faulty protocol run, to compute the attack bundle and to select an appropriate
patch rule to fix the protocol. We apply one rule at a time and resubmit the patched protocol to
the protocol verifier. This process iterates until either no more flaws are detected by the verifier, or
there are no more applicable rules. Since this approach constitutes some sort of rewrite system on
security protocols, it is tempting to analyze formal properties of rewrite systems, like confluence
and termination in this setting.
Suppose there is a faulty security protocol containing various flaws. In the first place, the order
in which Shrimp examines the flaws depends on the order in which attacks on the security protocol
are discovered by the protocol verifier. Given a particular attack bundle, we may have different
messages that allow the penetrator to mount the attack. Concerning a particular message, at
most one of the rules message-confusion, agent-naming and session binding would be applicable,
because the preconditions of the three rules exclude one another. As far as an attack makes use of
a faulty implementation and the attack bundle involves I-traces, there is a choice point between
patching the implementation, such that the type confusion is no longer applicable or patching the
protocol itself so that any type confusion does not cause any harm. Both patches are independent
of each other, since they operate on different levels. If the attacker bundle reveals several flaws,
i.e. there are various messages that can be misused to mount an attack, then, lemma 18 guarantees
that rules based on adaptations like the message-confusion and the agent-naming rules commute.
There is no strong argument concerning the termination of Shrimp, although in all our exam-
ples (see Section 7) it was never the case that our approach did not terminate. One reason is that
rules working on ambiguous messages will disambiguate them with respect to the entire bundle.
Therefore, the number of potentially ambiguous messages in a protocol will decrease with each
application of such a rule.
7 Results
Protocol Source Attack Source
Woo-Lam pi1 [41] [20]
Otway-Rees [9] [9]
Neuman-Stubblebine [33] [12]
KP [36] [36]
NSLPK [26] [20]
BAN Yahalom [9] [9]
GDOI [31] [31]
Table 1: Experimental results: protocols repaired by hand, part II
Tables 2 and 1 summarize our results. We considered 40 experiments, of which 20 involve pro-
tocols borrowed from the Clark-Jacob library;6 4 are variants of some of these protocols (annotated
with ?); 5 were borrowed from the literature (these 5 protocols are all known to be susceptible to
a type flaw attack); and 11 are protocols output by Shrimp, a next-generation of an input proto-
col. Next-generation protocols are shown in a separate row within the associated entry. Protocol
verification was carried out using AVISPA.
Table 2 portrays information about protocols that were fixed fully automatically. Each row
displays the result of testing a protocol against a (hierarchical) collection of properties: secrecy,
s, weak authentication of the initiator, wai (respectively responder, war) and strong authentica-
tion of the initiator, sai (respectively responder sar), where wai < sai (respectively war < sar.)
6The Clark-Jacob library comprehends 50 protocols, 26 out of which are known to be faulty. So our validation
test set contains all but 6 of these security protocols. The faulty protocols that were left out are not susceptible to
a replay attack.
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before after
Protocol s wai sai war sar M s wai sai war sar
ASRPC T T T T F B T T T T T
BAN ASRPC T F X X X N T T T T T
CCITTX.509(1) T F X X X N T T X X X
T T F X X B T T T T T
CCITTX.509(3) T F X T T N T T T T T
DSSK T T F X X B T T T T X
T T T T F B T T T T T
NSSK T T X T F B T T X T T
DSPK T F X X X N T T X X X
T T F X X B T T T X X
Kao Chow A. v1 T T F† T T B T T T T T
KSL T F X X X E T T T T T
NSPK F X X T T N T T T T T
BAN OR T F X X X N T T X X X
Splice/AS T X X F X N T T X T X
T T F T X B T T T T T
CJ Splice T F X T T B T T T T T
HC Splice T X X F X N T X X T X
WMF T F X X X E T T X X X
T T F X X B T T T T T
WMF++ ? T T F X X B T T T T T
ASRPC prune ? T F X X X N T T X X X
T T X F X N T T X T X
T T X T F B T T X T T
T T F T T B T T T T T
WLM T F X X X E T T T T T
BAN Yahalom T T T F X E T T T T T
A. DH ? T X X F X N T X X T X
T X X T F B T X X T T
2steps SK ? T X X F X N T X X T X
T X X T F B T T X T T
T T F T T B T T T T T
PS-APG [35] T T X F X E T T X T X
Table 2: Experimental results: protocols repaired automatically, part I. Columns before and after
are used to convey the properties that the associated protocol satsifies, (T)rue and (F)alse (X)
means property was not tested.) s stands for secrecy, wa for weak authentication, and sa stands for
strong authentication. The subscripts i and r denote the initiator and the responder, respectively.
29
While secrecy has a definite meaning, authentication is not; however, Lowe’s hierarchy of au-
thentication [27] has become the standard reference in the literature. Not surprisingly, AVISPA’s
levels of authentication, namely: weak authentication, and (strong) authentication, correspond to
Lowe’s. We refer the reader to [27] for the precise meaning of these terms.
The table separates the verification results for the original protocol, before, and the mended
protocol, after, as output by Shrimp. The field value that exists at the intersection between a
protocol P and a property φ might be either T, meaning P satisfies φ, F, meaning P does not
satisfy φ, or X, meaning this property was not tested (because P was not expected to satisfy
it.) Column M specifies the method that was applied to modify each faulty protocol: message
(E)ncoding, agent (N)aming or session (B)inding. In all our experiments, the application of a
patch method yielded a revised protocol able to satisfy the security property that the original
one did not. Whenever applicable, each mended protocol was then further requested to satisfy
the remaining, stronger properties in the hierarchy, thus explaining why some entries have several
runs. Note that in the discovery of some attacks we had to specify the possibility of losing a
session key (annotated with †.)
Shrimp is thus able to automatically identify a flaw and a successful candidate patch in
33 faulty protocols. Of these experiments, it applied 12 times agent-naming, 5 times message-
encoding, and 17 times session-binding. Notice that Shrimp was able to repair 18 protocolos of
the 20that were borrowed from Clark and Jacob. The other two protocols could not be corrected
automatically, since we are currently extending Shrimp so as to incorporate our extension of the
strand spaces to fully account for the theory presented in this paper. So, the faulty protocols in
Table 1 have been tested by hand only.
Further development work is also concerned with automatically translating a protocol (respec-
tively an attack) from a strand space notation to AVISPA HLPSL, and back. While most of these
translation can be automated, we anticipate human intervention will be required for the formula-
tion of security goals, using AVISPA’s special predicates, namely: witness, (weak) authentication,
and authentication on.
We have made Shrimp try to patch the IKEv2-DS protocol, which is part of AVISPA’s li-
brary and an abstraction of IKEv2. We found that, upon an abstraction of the equational issues
inherent to the AVISPA attack, Shrimp successfully identifies a violation to a good practice for
protocol design: the omission of principal names. While the revised protocol is up to satisfy
strong authentication on the session key, this patch may be subject to a criticism because IKEv2
was deliberately designed so that no principal should mention the name of its corresponding one.
We then deleted agent − naming and re-ran our experiment; this time Shrimp applied session
binding suggesting a protocol similar to IKEv2-DSx, which also is part of AVISPA’s library and
attack-free.
8 Related Work
We now proceed to compare our method against techniques that are rival in the sense outlined in
Section 1.
8.1 On Protocol Repair
R. Choo [13] has also looked at the problem of automated protocol repair. His development frame-
work applies the SHVT model checker [34] to perform a state-space analysis on a (indistinguishableness-
based) model of the protocol (encoded using asynchronous product automata) under analysis. If
the protocol is faulty, Choo’s framework will first check if the associated attack is captured in the
database of attack classes, and then will apply the repair. Unfortunately, the attack classes are
not formalized, and it is not clear whether for each class there is an associated repair method. [13]
introduces only one repair method; the method indiscriminately inserts the names of all the par-
ticipants involved in every cyphertext of the protocol. By way of comparison, for each attack class
we provide a formal characterization, amenable to mechanization, and an specific repair strategy.
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What is more, if applied, our naming repair mechanism will selectively introduce only the agent
names required to rule out the attack. Also, the class of replay attacks, fully captured by our
methods, comprehends the attack classes involved in [13].
8.2 On Protocol Compiling
The compiling approach to protocol development takes a protocol that is weak, in some security
sense, and returns other that is stronger, and made out of modifications of the input one. Example
methods in this vein include [22, 16, 2]. They are all based on the seminal work of Canetti on
universal composition, which we describe first as it will be the starting point of our comparison.
Canetti’s Universal composition theorem [11] is used to deduce the security of a complex sys-
tem, from a proof of the security of its constituents. For security protocol development, composi-
tion theorems are very attractive, since they assert that if a protocol is secure, when considered in
isolation, then it will remain secure, even if simultaneously run an unbounded number of times. In
particular, [11] has shown that for universal composition of a protocol to hold, it suffices that each
of its runs is independent, and that run independency can be guaranteed prefixing a pre-established
Session ID (SID) into every plaintext message, which is to be subject of a cryptoprimitive (en-
cryption or signing) by the protocol. We call this transformation SID session tagging. Although
Canetti provides various ways of forming and pre-establishing a SID, it is common for a SID to be
set the concatenation of the participants’ names, together with the fresh nonces such participants
have all previously generated, and exchanged one another (thus the name pre-established SID).
Canetti’s proof hinges on the assumption of state disjointness across all instances of a proto-
col, thus, ruling out the possibility of using, for example, long-term keys. Accordingly, Canetti
and Rabin [10], later on, showed that Canetti’s results still holds for an, albeit limited, shared
randomness, including long-term keys. Put differently, SID session tagging is enough to provide
state disjointness.
Yet, Ku¨sters and Tuengerthal [24] have recently shown that SID session tagging is quite a strong
transformation for separating runs one another. In particular, they established that universal
composition can be achieved on two provisos: first, that the protocol is secure in the single-
session setting, and, second, that it satisfies a property they call implicit disjointness. To put it
another way, real-world security protocols do not typically use a pre-established SID; therefore,
it is necessary to find a further ordinary condition, namely: implicit disjointness, whereby state
disjointness can be guaranteed. For a protocol P to satisfy implicit disjointness, two conditions are
required. First, participants are not compromised. Second, conversations in a session, especially
decryption preceeded by encryption, must match. Session matching is, in turn, guaranteed by
an appropriate partnering function. Together, implicit disjointness and single-session security,
resemble Gutmann’s notion of skeleton [19]. Implicit disjointness can be met simply by selectively
inserting randomness in cryptographic material.
In the remaining of this section, we survey protocol compiling methods, stemmed from com-
position theorems. We shall assume that, after k previous rounds, participants a1, . . . , ak have
exchanged fresh nonces, n1, . . . ,nk, to come out with SID = a1; . . . ; ak;n1; . . . nk.
Katz and Yung [23] first showed how to turn a Key Exchange (KE) protocol, known to be
secure against a passive adversary, into one that is secure against an active adversary; i.e., into an
authenticated KE protocol. Their method transforms each protocol step, j. ai → ai+1 : j; ai;m,
into:
j : ai → ai+1. j; ai;m; [|j;m;SID|]K−ai
Later on, Cortier et al. [16] suggested a transformation that guarantees beyond authentication,
at the cost of assuming a weaker input protocol that is only functional. Each protocol step,
j. ai → ai+1 : m, they change into:
j : ai → ai+1. {|m; [|j;m;SID|]K−ai |}Kai+1
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which makes heavy use of cryptoprimitives. Notice that, in particular, [23, 16]’s methods depend
on the creation of new signing/encryption key pairs, apart from those that already appear in the
original protocol. Finally, Arapinis et al. [2] suggested a straightforward application of Canetti’s
universal composition theorem, using SID session tagging, although only cyphertexts are modified.
Notice that the plus of this method is that it does not require the creation of new key pairs.
Thus, following the result of [24], all these protocol refinement techniques have several weak-
nesses. Firstly, most assume the existence and availability of a public key infrastructure. Secondly,
they increase both the round complexity, and the message complexity: the extra message exchange
implements actually a form of contributary key-agreement protocol; yet, minimizing the number
of communications usually is a design goal. Thirdly, they involve additional, indiscriminate com-
putational effort, associated to the extra encrypted material, thus increasing the communication
complexity. Fourthly, SID session tagging is as typing tagging (see review on [20] below), albeit
dynamic, and thus poses the same additional vulnerabilities (the adversary knows SID, and, there-
fore, can use it to drive the breaking of long-term keys). And fifthly, in all these mechanisms, it
is assumed that the participants are all honest: this is restrictive, since it is necessary to consider
attacks where the penetrator is part of the group, or even where several participants collude to
exclude one or more participants, as in [32]. These properties are all in contrast with our ap-
proach, since: we do not require extra key pairs; we selectively include extra rounds, by means
of key confirmation; we selectively insert extra bits of information on an specific message; and we
minimize the use of tags.
Concluding, even the less heavily cryptographic dependant mechanism of protocol refine-
ment [2] would ‘repair’, for example, NSPK (see Example 6) as follows:
a→ b : n
b→ a : n′
a→ b : {|a; b;n;n′; a;na|}Kb
b→ a : {|a; b;n;n′;na;nb|}Ka
a→ b : {|a; b;n;n′;nb|}Kb
This increases the number of rounds, and triples the size of the messages to be ciphered. Also,
notice that Choo’s approach would not include the extra first two steps, but would tag each
message to be cyphered using SID = a; b. By way of comparison, our repair mechanism would
yield NSLPK (see Example 14.)
8.3 On Further Strategies for Protocol Repair, Based on Old Principles
When considering an automatic protocol repair mechanism like ours, one wonders whether there is
an upper bound as to the information that every message should include to avoid a replay. If there
is one, we could simply ensure that every message conforms it previous to any verification attempt.
Carlsen [12] has looked into this upper bound. He suggested that to avoid replays every message
should include five pieces of information: protocol-id, session-id, step-id, message subcomponent-
id and primitive type of data items. In a similar vein, Malladi et al. [29] suggested one should
add a session-id contributed to by every participant to any cyphertext in the protocol, as in [11],
and Aura [4] suggested one should also use several crypto-algorithms in one protocol and hash
any authentication message and any session key. Protocol designers, however, find including all
these elements cumbersome.7 By comparison, Shrimp only inserts selected pieces of information
considering the attack at hand but may add steps to the protocol if necessary to fulfill a stronger
security property. What is more, it follows, from Canetti’s universal composition theorem, that
these all principles are subsumed by SID session tagging, which inserts even less information.
7This is indeed supported by, for example, [24], who state that while the use of a pre-established SID is a good
design principle, real-world security protocol do not adhere to it, at least not in the explicit way portrayed by this
principle.
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8.4 On Protocol Synthesis
Complementary to ours is the work of Perrig and Song [35], who have developed a system, called
APG, for the synthesis of security protocols. The synthesis process, though automated, is generate
and test: APG generates (extends) a protocol step by step, taking into account the security
requirements, and then discards those protocols that do not satisfy them. APG is limited to
generate only 3-party protocols (two principals and one server). As a reduction technique, it uses
an impersonation attack and so rules out protocols that (trivially) fail to provide authenticity.
The main problem to this tool is the combinatorial explosion (the search space is of the order 1012
according to the authors).
8.5 On Type Flaw Attacks
In the past, several approaches have been developed to deal with potential type flaw attacks.
This work can be classified into two different areas: The first area is concerned with changing
the representation of messages to prevent type flaw attacks in the first place. Heather et al. [20]
use a tagging of messages to identify the type of a message in a unique way. Considering original
messages combined with their tagging as new atomic entities, such messages constitute a generated
algebraic datatype with non-overlapping ranges of the constructors satisfying the most important
properties of the abstract message theory. Since tags themselves will reveal information about a
message to a penetrator there are several refinements of this tagging approach to minimize the set
of subterms of a message that have to be tagged (e.g. [28, 29]).
The second area is concerned with the verification of protocols that may contain type-flaw
attacks. A prominent approach is to replace the standard representation of messages as a freely
generated datatype by a more involved datatype dealing with equations between constructor terms.
As a consequence, terms representing messages have to be unified modulo a theory modeling the
equality relation on messages. While this approach assumes that only entire messages can be
interpreted in different ways, Meadows [30, 31] investigated the problem that the implementation
of a message could be cut into pieces and one of such pieces might be used to mock another message,
e.g. some part of a bit-string representing an encrypted message is reused as a nonce. In her model,
messages are represented as bit-streams. Based on an information flow analysis of the protocol and
the knowledge how abstract messages are represented as bit-streams, probabilities are computed
as to how likely a message could be guessed (or constructed) by a penetrator. This is in contrast
to our possibilistic approach, in which we abstract from unlikely events, e.g. that independently
guessing a key and a nonce will result in messages that share the same implementation. This is
reflected in our notion of originating messages occurring on I-traces. The strand space approach
excludes protocol runs in which messages are not uniquely originating resulting in a possibilistic
approach in a somewhat idealized world. In our approach, for instance, a nonce can be only
camouflaged by a message, which itself is camouflaged at some point with the help of the same
nonce (c.f. definition 4).
We separate the protocol level operating on abstract messages from its implementation level.
This is in contrast to many other approaches that encode implementation details in an equality
theory on (abstract) messages. The benefit is that we can use (arbitrary) algebraic specifications
to formalize properties (in particular equality and inequality) of the message implementation. This
knowledge about the implementation is used to verify side conditions of I-traces. In order to apply
I-traces in the penetrator bundle we have to make sure that both messages of the trace share the
same implementation. This is a task that can be given to an automated theorem prover or to
specialized deduction system incorporating domain specific knowledge (e.g. SMT-provers).
9 Conclusions
We presented a framework for patching security protocols. The framework is formalized based on
the notion of strand spaces, which we have extended to deal also with type flaw attacks. Given a
specification for the implementation of messages, an additional I-trace rule allows the penetrator
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to interchange messages that share the same implementation. While the original purpose of
this extension was to provide a uniform representation language for protocol runs (potentially
containing type flaw attacks), it is also interesting to investigate how the verification methodology
of strand spaces can be lifted to our extended approach.
Based on this formalization, we classify the situations in which a penetrator can reuse messages
communicated by honest principals to mount attacks. This gives rise to various patch rules, which
cope with different types of flaws. It is interesting to see that there are typically two alternative
ways to overcome type flaw attacks. On the one hand, we can change the implementation in
order to avoid the particular equalities on implemented messages; and, on the other hand, we can
change the protocol on the abstract level, in order avoid situations in which one can exploit these
properties in the implementation. The framework has been implemented in the Shrimp system
and successfully evaluated in a large set of faulty security protocols.
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